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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE1958 TENNESSEE SURVEY
CHARLES H. MILLER*

In surveying the field of criminal law and procedure the cases presented to the supreme court during the year were little more than
normal or typical. Several of the criminal cases are not presented in
detail in this article, as they are dealt with in other survey sections.
SUBSTANTIVE LAW

Homicide: In the case of Edwards v. State' the court again relies
upon the doctrine of Keller v. State,2 in which decision the court held
that driving an automobile while intoxicated is an act malum in se,
and when a person is killed by an automobile being driven by one
who is intoxicated, the driver is guilty of homicide without showing
the causal connection between the death and the driver's act, 3 which
homicide can be involuntary manslaughter 4 or second degree murder.5
The court, sustaining the conviction of second degree murder, overruled the contention of the defense that he could not be guilty of such
crime, as his state of intoxication precluded malice. 6 The defendant,
who had voluntarily put himself in an intoxicated condition, driving
on the highway at a high rate of speed, struck a highway patrolman
who was standing by a parked car. Since the act under the theory of
Keller v. State was malum in se, it was not necessary to show that
the death was the probable result of the criminal act of intoxication.
The facts show that the motorist drove his car on the highway at a
high rate of speed heedless of danger to others. Such intoxication
does not preclude malice, and under the rules of this state he was
7
properly found guilty of second degree murder.
In the case of Lewis v. State8 there was also a conviction of murder
in the second degree and the court found nothing in the record that
would tend to exonerate the defendant from the charge of murder.
* Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law.
1. 304 S.W.2d 500 (Tenn. 1957).
2. 155 Tenn. 633, 299 S.W, 803 (1927), 41 HARV. L. REv. 669 (1927).

3. Davis v. State, 194 Tenn. 282, 250 S.W.2d 534 (1952); Whitlock v. State,

187 Tenn. 522, 216 S.W.2d 22 (1948).

4. Keller v. State, 155 Tenn. 633, 299 S.W. 803 (1927).

5. Owen v. State, 188 Tenn. 459, 221 S.W.2d 515 (1949).

6. Id. at 468.
7. Atkins v. State, 119 Tenn. 458, 481, 105 S.W. 353 (1907). "[I]t is murder
in such case though the perpetrator is drunk .. . . Hence a party cannot show
that he was so drunk as not to be capable of entertaining a malicious feeling."
See State v. Trott, 190 N.C. 674, 130 S.E. 627 (1925); Rogers v. State, 196 Tenn.
263, 265 S.W.2d 559 (1953).
8. 304 S.W.2d 322 (Tenn. 1957).
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The court overruled the assignment of error that there was no
evidence of malice, and that the circumstances of the killing were
insufficient to prove murder as there were no eye witnesses, and that
the evidence was entirely circumstantial and not inconsistent with the
hypothesis that the shot was fired accidentally rather than willfully.
Defendant and several others had gone to the country in a truck to
obtain some lumber which the defendant had purchased from the
deceased. The defendant, the seller, and two friends who were along
indulged in a bit of drinking on the trip to the saw mill and while they
were loading the lumber they became loaded with spirits fermenti.
The defendant and the deceased had an argument as to the value of the
lumber. The defendant had a pistol in his pocket and showed it to
several of the members of the group. On the way back they stopped
and two of the men got out, leaving the deceased and the defendant in
the cab of the truck alone. Shortly thereafter one witness heard
a shot and looked towards the men in the truck. The defendant still
had a pistol in his hand and the deceased, who was unarmed, was
mortally wounded and died shortly thereafter. There was evidence
of what went on prior to the shooting and subsequent to the shooting
but what happened at the time of the homicide is not testified to
except by the defendant himself who stated that he was so drunk
that he did not know what he was doing. The defense was that
there was no evidence of malice nor was the firing of the shot done
maliciously or willfully. The court states that when a homicide is
clearly proven and the slayer is ascertained and nothing else is proven,
the killing is presumed to be criminal, 9 as every person is presumed
to intend the usual and natural consequences of his acts. 10 Malice
is presumed under the same circumstances until the contrary appears
from either the direct or the circumstantial evidence." The court,
in ruling that where the killing may be proven and no accompanying
circumstances appear in evidence there is a presumption that the
killing was done maliciously, is following the well established rule in
this state.'2 There were no circumstances indicating that the killing
9. Draper v. State, 63 Tenn. 246 (1874).
10. Ibid.

11. Foster v. State, 74 Tenn. 213 (1880); Epperson v. State, 73 Tenn. 291
(1880).
12. Coffee v. State, 11 Tenn. 283 (1832). "Presumptions only arise where
there is an absence of proof. In homicides, when the fact of killing with its
attendant circumstances is proved clearly and satisfactorily, so. that the
proof either shows express malice, or that there was no malice at all, there
is nothing to be presumed either the one way or the other; but in cases where
the killing may be proved and no accompanying circumstances appear in the
evidence, the law presumes that the killing was done maliciously. So where
the killing is proved, and the circumstances attending it are shown, though no
express malice may appear from the proof, it may be presumed from some
attending fact, as if a deadly weapon were used, the law presumes malice."
Id. at 287. See Bryant v. State, 66 Tenn. 67 (1872).
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was accidental; the court therefore concludes that it was done with
malice, which supports the charge of second degree murder. 13
In a conviction of second degree murder in the case of Hunt v.
State,14 the court suggests a reduction in sentence to voluntary manslaughter under the rule that death under circumstances which indicate mutual combat, and which grows out of a sudden heat of the
combat, is voluntary manslaughter, 15 and not second degree murder.1 6
Defendant was at the home of a friend when the deceased came
seeking an occupant of the house who had attacked the deceased's
wife. There was a conflict of testimony as to whether or not the defendant came out of the house or was attacked inside, but there was
sufficient evidence of mutual combat. There was evidence that both
parties were using deadly weapons. The common law held that the
killing of a person from a sudden transportation of passion or heat of
blood, as in a fight or sudden combat, is manslaughter, and where the
defendant willingly engaged in a gun battle out of passion aroused
by an unprovoked assault, the killing would be manslaughter.'1 The
court reversed with the instruction to correct the judgment with the
consent of the state and to enter sentence as manslaughter. Of course,
if the state does not consent, the case will be remanded for a new
8
trial.'
PROCEDURE

One of the interesting cases, although a civil action for the wrongful
death of the plaintiff's husband under the theory that the husband was
killed in an unlawful manner without justification, was that of Gross
v. Abston,19 in which the court in its decision discussed fully the rights
of arrest and the right of an officer or individual to use force in making
an arrest or apprehending a fleeing criminal. The court quotes from
20
the case of Human v. Goodman:
An officer has no absolute right to kill, either to take a prisoner, or to
prevent his escape, even in felonies, unless reasonably necessary to prevent escape; and whether or not there is a reasonable necessity for an
officer to shoot a felon in flight, and the reasonableness of the grounds
on which the officer acted, are questions for the jury.

The court then overruled the lower court on the ground that the jury
could not find that the defendant had reason to believe that he was
shooting at a fleeing felon instead of a misdemeanant.2
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Atkins v. State, 119 Tenn. 458, 105 S.W. 353 (1907).
303 S.W.2d 740 (Tenn. 1957).
TE N. CODE ArN. § 39-2409 (1956).
State v. Durham, 201 N.C. 724, 161 S.E. 398 (1931).
State v. Miller, 223 N.C. 184, 25 S.E.2d 623 (1943).
Forsha v. State, 183 Tenn. 604, 194 S.W.2d 463 (1946).
19. 311 S.W.2d 817 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1957).
20. 159 Tenn. 241, 243, 18 S.W.2d 381 (1928).
21. Goodrich v. Morgan, 291 S.W.2d 610 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1956).
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The defendant found the plaintiff's husband looking into a bedroom
of an adjoining house occupied by the defendant's mother and young
sister and testified to the fact that he saw the deceased trying to raise
the window. He was called to and told to halt when he started to run
but failed to do so, and the defendant shot him. The theory of the
defendant was that the plaintiff's husband was attempting to break
into the home in the night time. Therefore, he committed a felony,
and defendant was in the process of making an arrest for a felony committed in his presence and had a right to use whatever force was necessary to apprehend him. The court found that the most the deceased
could have been guilty of was the "Peeping Tom Act" which is a misdemeanor.2 The court reviews the right of an officer to use force in
making an arrest or to shoot a felon in flight if that is the only means
of preventing his escape,2 but, of course, an officer has no right to
shoot anyone guilty of only a misdemeanor to stop his flight or prevent
his escape. The right of a private person is more restricted than the
right of an officer to make an arrest.24
In the case of Duncan v. State,2 the court considered the case of a
real estate broker who had been prosecuted for a fraudulent breach
of trust and embezzlement. He had unsuccessfully offered in evidence
a contract between the seller and himself to show that his compensation was to be all money received over the agreed selling price. The
seller had agreed to accept $3600 for the property. The purchaser paid
$200 in earnest money on an agreed purchase price of $3900. Subsequent to the payment of the earnest money a fire completely destroyed
the house on the property, and $3000 in insurance was collected by
the owner. The defendant claimed the $200 as part of his compensation, and claimed that the purchaser was entitled to the deed upon the
payment of $900 (over and above $3000 collected on insurance by the
owners), since the owners had only equitable title to the property
after the $200 was paid. The court held that there was no criminal
liability on the part of the defendant in obtaining the $200, as he had
a right to retain all over and above $3600 as his own.2 The court found
that there was a joint ownership in the collected fund because of his
contract of compensation, and he could enforce a vendor's lien on the
property for his compensation.2 7 Therefore, he had not been guilty
of fraud on failure to turn the money over to the owners. He was not
an agent of the buyer and could not be guilty of eiibezzlement, as
22. TENN. CODE ANN.
321, 81 S.E. 458 (1914).

§ 39-1212 (1956). See also State v. McClure, 166 N.C.

23. Love v. Bass, 145 Tenn. 522, 238 S.W. 94 (1921).
24. Martin v. Castner-Knott Dry Goods Co., 27 Tenn. App. 421, 181 S.W.2d
638 (M.S. 1944).
25. 304 S.W.2d 625 (Tenn. 1957).
26. Burke v. State, 157 Tenn. 105, 6 S.W.2d 556 (1928).
27. Moss v. Thomas, 218 Ala. 141, 117 So. 648, 58 A.L.R. 1495 (1928).
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his rights were those of a joint owner. 28 He could not be guilty of
fraudulent breach of trust, as there was no trust relationship with
the seller where he had an interest in the money retained as his own. 29
In the case of Franklin v. State,30 the defendant was convicted of
receiving stolen property. In the absence of proof, either direct or
circumstantial, of the receipt of the stolen property from a third
party, jury could not convict defendants of receiving stolen property.
Defendant was charged in a two-count indictment of larceny and
also of receiving and concealing stolen property. The conviction of
receiving stolen property amounted to an acquittal of the charge of
larceny.3 1 The facts of the case were that the defendant and a
companion, after visiting a friend in the country, were found the next
day in the possession of two of the friend's calves which they claimed
to have purchased. There was no evidence of the receipt of the property from a third party. Granting that there may have been sufficient
evidence to support a verdict of stealing the property, such is not
sufficient to support a verdict of receiving such property knowing it
to be stolen. This was discussed further in Parham v. State.32 Since
the jury returned a verdict that the defendants were guilty of the
charge of receiving and since there was no evidence of a third party
having committed the larceny and that the defendants received the
property knowing it to be stolen, 33 defendants were ordered discharged.
In the case of Valley v. State,34 the court decided the question as to
whether or not it is necessary to have an assault or attempted assault
35
to convict one of an attempt to commit a felony under the statute.
Defendant was charged with assault with an attempt to commit a
felony, which assault was in the nature of a proposal to a fourteen
year old boy for acts of sexual perversion. The minute entry of the
lower court shows the defendant guilty of an attempt to commit a
felony upon the witness. The bill of exceptions shows the defendant
was found guilty of felonious assault. The court, in holding that the
statute covers both assault with an attempt to commit a felony and
any attempt otherwise to commit a felony, cited the case of Senter
v. State,36 where the court stated under this section that the attempt
may be made by a personal assault on another or it may be made by
28. Baker v. Cooper, 201 App. Div. 639, 194 N.Y.S. 726 (1922).
29. People v. O'Farrell, 247 Ill. 44, 93 N.E. 136 (1910). See also Burke v.
State, 157 Tenn. 105, 6 S.W.2d 556 (1928).
30. 308 S.W.2d 417 (Tenn. 1957).
31. TENN. CODE ANN.§§ 39-4217, 18 (1956).
32. 78 Tenn. 498 (1882).
33. Asbury v. State, 178 Tenn. 43, 154 S.W.2d 794 (1941).
34. 309 S.W.2d 374 (Tenn. 1958).
35. TENxN. CODE AN. § 39-603 (1956).
36. 187 Tenn. 517, 216 S.W.2d 21 (1948).
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a simple attempt without a personal assault.3 7 Necessary to the court's
decision is the conclusion that mere words of solicitation are sufficient
to constitute an attempt. This view is not supported by prior cases
in this jurisdiction 8 This would be likened to the case of soliciting
a child under twelve years of age to have sexual intercourse, and in
so doing the person would be guilty of attempt to commit rape upon
such child.39 The court concluded that the evidence did not show an
actual assault, but it did show an attempt to commit a felony and the
punishment is the same in either case. The chief justice dissented,
but there is no written opinion of the dissent.
A case of interest in the field of searches and seizures was presented
in an action by the commissioner of taxation for confiscation of an
41
revenue agents, after
automobile. 40 In the case of Atkins v. Harris,
purchasing whiskey from defendant's wife, arrested defendant and his
wife for the possession of unstamped whiskey. The revenue agents
did not have a warrant. Subsequent to the arrest, his automobilewhich was parked on adjoining property but within about eleven feet
of his home-revealed other unstamped whiskey. The court was
faced with the decision as to what limitations are placed upon the
limited search of a defendant's person and his surroundings by the
clause "immediate surroundings" as used in the statute.4 It must be
borne in mind that the situation here does not involve that as set out
in Dolen v. State,43 where the search was limited by a valid search
warrant to the property and premises of the defendant, and the automobile in the Dolen case was located on the property other than that
belonging to the defendant. There was no question about the lawfulness of the arrest of the defendant or his wife for the possession of
unstamped whiskey. There is no question of the fact that in this state,
where the arrest is lawful, the arresting officer has a right to search
the prisoner and his surroundings.4 The only question is: what are
"immediate surroundings"? The case holds that they are not necessarily limited to the property controlled by the accused unless so
limited by a valid search warrant.45 The cpurt cites the case of State
v. One Buick Automobile 46 where the defendant was arrested in his
37. Rafferty v. State, 91 Tenn. 655, 16 S.W. 728 (1891).
38. See Annots., 40 Am. REP. 656 (1912); 25 L.R.A. 434 (1894).
39. McEwing v. State, 134 Tenn. 649 (1915).
40. TEN. CODE ANN.§ 57-622 (1956).
41. 304 S.W.2d 650 (Tenn. 1957).
42. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-803 (1956).

43. 187 Tenn. 663, 216 S.W.2d 351 (1948).
44. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-803 (1956); Elliott v. State, 173 Tenn. 203, 116
S.W.2d 1009 (1938). See McCanless v. Evans, 177 Tenn. 86, 90, 146 S.W.2d

354 (1941), where the court stated, "A search warrant is unnecessary to make
a lawful search of the premises, or the immediate surroundings of the person
where the arrest is made."
45. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
46. 120 Ore. 640, 253 Pac. 366 (1927).
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apartment and the search of his automobile which was parked in
the apartment house garage was upheld. In another case where the
defendant was arrested in a restaurant and, after proper arrest, search
was made of his automobile which was parked on the street, such was
upheld as "immediate surroundings. ' '47 The arresting officer obviously
can go further in his search of immediate surroundings of the person
arrested after lawful arrest without a search warrant than he could
with the limitation placed on "immediate surroundings" by "property
under his control" under a properly executed search warrant. 48
Venue: In Kelly v. State49 the defendant appealed from a conviction
of breaking and entering a business house on the grounds that there
was no proof by the state as to the section of the city in which the
business house was located. Under the constitution the defendant
has a right to be tried in the county in which the offense was committed. 50 If a crime is shown to have been committed in or near a
certain town or other minor territorial subdivision it is not necessary
to show that this territorial subdivision is in the county, as the jury
as part of the court could take notice of this geographical fact.5 ' Since

venue is a matter of proof, the proof must show to the satisfaction of
the court and the jury that the crime was committed in the county
where the indictment was found and the accused was tried. 52 The
court ruled that the only allegation was that the business was located
in Bristol, Tennessee, and the only specific fact that the jury could
take notice of under the circumstances was the fact that half of the
town was in Virginia and the other half in Tennessee. The location
of the business house, the locus in quo, in the particular section of
the city under the particular circumstances, was not a specific fact of
which the jury was bound to take notice, and in the absence of proof
53
that the business house was in the county, venue was not established.
This would not have been true if the reference had been to Nashville
or other cities within the particular counties of the state.
The question in the case of Beadle v. StateM was whether or not the
lower court committed reversible error in refusing to appoint a court
reporter at the request of a pauper defendant. The defendant was
tried for first degree murder for the killing of the husband of his first
47. State v. Cyr, 40 Wash.2d 840, 246 P.2d 480 (1952).
48. Bromley v. State, 310 S.W.2d 432 (Tenn. 1958), where stolen property
was found after search of premises was made with a void search warrant.

Court rules evidence not admissible as no lawful arrest made before search.
Robertson v. State, 184 Tenn. 277, 198 S.W.2d 633 (1947).
49. 308 S.W.2d 415 (Tenn. 1957).
50. TtNN.CONST., art. 1, § 9.
51. UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 95 (5th ed. 1956).

52. Gilliland v. State, 187 Tenn. 592, 216 S.W.2d 323 (1948); Ford v. State,
184 Tenn. 443, 201 S.W.2d 539 (1945).
53. Franklin v. State, 64 Tenn. 613 (1875).

54. 310 S.W.2d 157 (Tenn. 1958).
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wife because they were living together before she had received a
divorce from defendant, to the embarrassment of his fourteen year
old son who was being teased at school by his playmates. There was
evidence of threats by th6 deceased and also of the fact that he had
a knife five inches long at the time he was killed. There was sufficient
evidence for conviction of voluntary manslaughter. The question
here is one relating to the record, and the refusal of the lower court
to appoint a court reporter, therefore depriving the defendant, a
pauper, of equal protection of the law under the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. The assignment of error
was presented on the basis of the case of Griffin v. Illinois5 where the
United States Supreme Court held that where a transcript was required one must be provided by the court to those whose poverty
might deprive them of equal justice. In the Beadle case, counsel filed
a narrative bill of exceptions which was approved by the court. The
court holds that this was a sufficient transcript to protect the defendant amply in all of his rights. The rules of the Tennessee Supreme
Court, clearly indicate that the court has a preference for the narrative
bill of exceptions and therefore does not discriminate against a person
who cannot have a stenographic transcript of the record for the appeal.
The United States Supreme Court does not require that a stenographic
report be provided if the Supreme Court finds other means of affording
adequate and effective appellate review to indigent defendants.5
That court did say, however, that it was necessary to have a stenographic report of the transcript of the record to afford equal protection
if one is required by the state court. Under those circumstances it
would be a denial of due process under the fourteenth amendment if
provisions were not made for the required transcript to be provided
for a pauper.
Again the court finds in the case of Graham v. State57 a reversible
error in allowing the attorney general of the state to argue the indeterminate sentence -law to the jury, as it is not the law of the case or
any part of it and could only persuade the jury to give consideration
to it in fixing the defendant's punishment. 58
In the case of Collier v. State,59 the court preserves the distinction
between the technical record and the record of the proceedings which
must be embodied in a bill of exceptions. On the technical record the
court decides the question whether or not a charge of breaking and
entering 60 will support a conviction of malicious mischief. 61
55. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).

56. Miller v. United States, 317 U.S. 192 (1942).
57. 304 S.W.2d 622 (Tenn. 1957).

58. Williams v. State, 191 Tenn. 456, 234 S.W.2d 993 (1950).
59. 308 S.W.2d 427 (Tenn. 1957).
60. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-903 (1956).
61. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-4501, -04 (1956).
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The defendant was charged with malicious mischief and upon conviction an appeal was made to the supreme court. The bill of exceptions was not filed within the thirty days after the overruling of a
motion for a new trial, but was fied fifty-seven days later.
At the time of overruling the motion for a new trial defendant was
granted forty-five days in which to prepare his bill of exceptions.
More than thirty days after the overruling of the motion for a new
trial, but before the expiration of the forty-five days previously
granted for the filing of the bill of exceptions, a motion was made
to extend the time for an additional fifteen days. The bill of exceptions
was filed a total of fifty-seven days after the overruling of the motion
for a new trial. The trial court was without authority to extend the
time for the filing of the bill, and the supreme court ruled that it
would not be considered for any purposes since it was a nullity when
filed. 62 The technical record does not indicate that the defendant had
been charged with malicious mischief as had been orally stipulated
would be included in the indictment which was rendered on a charge
of breaking and entering. Since the indictment only charged breaking and entering, defendant contended that it would not support the
verdict of malicious mischief. The indictment charged that he broke
and destroyed a door and other parts of the house and personal property therein. The statute declares that it would be a misdemeanor to
destroy, injure, or secrete any goods, chattels, or valuable papers of
another. It also declares to be a misdemeanor wantonly to injure,
deface, or disfigure any building or fixture attached thereto, or the
enclosures thereof, belonging to the state, or any county, city, town,
or to another person. 63 The court concluded that it would be impossible for anyone to be guilty of breaking into and entering a building
without also being guilty of disfiguring or defacing it. Therefore, it
concluded this lesser offense (malicious mischief) must be included
within the greater (breaking and entering).
On the other hand, there is no necessary connection of injury of
personal property and the offense of breaking and entering, but this
defect (including the latter offense or misdemeanor in the same count
in the indictment) is not a fatal defect and was waived when the
defendant went to trial.64 The court without difficulty concludes that
the term "feloniously" which appears in the indictment takes care
of the requirement that the acts done to constitute mischief be done
"maliciously and wantonly." 65
62. Duboise v. State, 290 S.W.2d 646 (Tenn. 1956).
63. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4504 (1956).

64. Allen v. State, 199 Tenn. 569, 288 S.W.2d 439 (1956); Johnson v. State,
187 Tenn. 438, 215 S.W.2d 816 (1948); Scruggs v. State, 66 Tenn. 38 (1872).
65. State v. Smith, 119 Tenn. 521, 105 S.W. 68 (1907); State v. Click, 115
Tenn. 283, 90 S.W. 855 (1905).
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The test for insane delusion and insanity was restated in the case of
Long v. State,66 where the question of insane delusion was presented
as a defense to the charge of murder in the first degree. The defendant
was charged with killing his son's stepfather under the belief that the
deceased intended or was attempting to debauch the defendant's
daughter-in-law. Defendant's wife had remarried, and they had all
lived in the same community for a number of years. When the son
married he moved in with his father, living together and jointly
participating in the farming activities. During the last few months of
this period the son began to act in a disturbed manner and had to
be confined in the state hospital. The daughter-in-law told the defendant that the son was upset because he thought she was carrying on
with his stepfather. The deceased came to the home to get farm
machinery which had been borrowed by defendant's son from his
stepfather. Defendant shot the deceased and then chased him down
the road firing continuously until the pistol was empty, inflicting
mortal wounds upon the deceased.
Under the test for insanity in this case, as set out in Davis v. State,67
the jury was warranted in concluding that he was not temporarily
insane and that he knew right from wrong. Defense had asked for
instruction on the part of the lower court that if .he was not insane
(because proof might show that he knew the difference between right
and wrong as set out in the McNaughten case) but nevertheless was
laboring under an insane delusion regarding the relationship between
the stepfather and his son's wife, he should at the most only be guilty
of voluntary manslaughter. Defendant argued that this instruction
was supported by the Davis case, in which the jury found the defendant knew the difference between right and wrong but was insane upon
the subject of the relationship between his former wife and the deceased. The chief justice stated in the Davis case that the McNaughten
rule was that homicide comnitted under an insane delusion would be
reduced to manslaughter if the notion embodied in the delusion and
believed to be a fact, if a fact indeed, would have excused the defendant.
In the Davis case, if the defendant had been convinced of the truth
of the alleged relationship, and while under the influence of passion
and agitation produced by such information had killed the deceased,
he would only have been guilty of voluntary manslaughter. In the
present case, however, the relationship of the female is that of the
daughter-in-law, and there was no well founded belief that she had
been guilty of adultery. The court sustained the lower court in overruling the requested instruction on the basis that the instruction is
66. 304 S.W.2d 492 (Tenn. 1957).

67. 161 Tenn. 23, 28 S.W.2d 993 (1930).
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incorrect in that it makes any insane delusion a bar to a conviction
for murder; whereas, under the McNaughten rule the delusion must
be as to something believed to be a fact, which if a fact indeed, would
have excused the defendant. 68 In the present case there was no belief
in the fact, and the court suggests that the relationship of the female
being that of the daughter-in-law might not have been such as to
reduce the offense to voluntary manslaughter though he had a well
founded belief that she had been guilty of adultery.69 This case again
exemplified a need for further medico-legal study of present legal tests
for insanity.70
In the case of Hill v. State,71 the defendant had been convicted of a
series of larcenies on November 15, 1949, and was sentenced to five
years to be served in the workhouse. Sentence was suspended in
1953 and in the early part of 1954 the defendant was arrested for
several other larcenies and was out on bond and out of the state during the spring of 1954. Petition was filed by the attorney general on
August 30, 1954, requesting revocation of the suspended sentence. The
petition was not served on the defendant and was retired October 4,
1956, on the ground that the defendant could not be found. On November 26, 1956, he was served at the request of the attorney general
who stated that the defendant had been a fugitive from justice since
1954. The defendant contended that the lower court had no legal
authority to revoke the suspended sentence after November 26, 1954,
when the original sentence of five years had expired. The question
was, did the statute of limitations bar the proceedings for revocation
of sentence, since the petition had been retired from the docket and
no service was had on the defendant until after the expiration of the
judgment of conviction. 72 The court ruled there was sufficient evidence of the forfeiture of the appearance bond to indicate that the
defendant was a fugitive from justice in August 1954, and that this
accounted for the failure to serve the capias until November 26, 1956.
In the absence of direct proof the record of the minutes of the court
was accepted as prima facie truth, and the lower court had recorded
in the minutes that he was a fugitive from justice and this had tolled
73
the statute of limitations.
68. 8 VANI.

L. REv. 496 (1955).

69. Id. at 497. See also Whitsett v. State, 299 S.W.2d 2 (Tenn. 1957).
70. Tatum v. United States, 190 F.2d 612 (1951); State v. White, 58 N.M. 324,
270 P.2d 727 (1954); Kalven, Insanity and the Criminal Law-A Critique of
Durham v. United States, U. Cmi. L. R.v. 317 (1955); Moreland, Mental Responsibility and the CriminalLaw-A Defence, 45 Ky. L.J. 215 (1957); Sobeloff,
From McNaughton to Durham, and Beyond-A Discussion of Insanity and the
Criminal Law, 15 Mo. L. REv. 93 (1955); Sobeloff, Insanity and the Criminal
Law, 41 A.B.A.J. 793 (1955).

71. 304 S.W.2d 619 (Tenn. 1957).
72. Id. at 621.
73. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2907 (1956).

19581

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE

1235

Bomar v. State ex rel. Boyd and Bomar v. State ex rel. Winslow 4
are combined habeas corpus proceedings by two persons serving life
sentences under the 1939 Habitual Criminal Act.

5

The lower court

sustained the petition and the warden appealed. The petitioners contended the act was unconstitutional in that it provided for trial as a
habitual criminal in conjunction with a trial for a fourth felony without formal notice in advance of the trial that the act would be invoked.
The act provided that the indictment for the felony may or may not
charge the defendant with being a habitual criminal, but the defendant
"in either case shall, upon conviction, be sentenced and punished as
an habitual criminal, as in this act provided. '76 The act says further
that "in either case the felony charge shall be deemed and construed
as necessarily including and charging such person with being an
habitual criminal, and no such indictment or presentment shall be
include a charge
subject to any objection for failure to specifically
77
criminal.1
habitual
an
is
that such person
Both petitioners had pleaded not guilty to indictments which
charged them with being habitual criminals in addition to the specific
felonies-robbery in Boyd's case, assault to commit murder in the first
degree in Winslow's case. Each was found "guilty as charged in the
indictment" and sentenced to life imprisonment as a habitual criminal.
Prior to the decisions in the instant habeas corpus proceedings, another Tennessee prisoner named Rhea had been freed by writ of
habeas corpus in the United States district court on grounds that the
above quoted sections violated the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment of the United States Constitution and that the defendant
should have been given notice in the indictment or otherwise that the
state expected to invoke the act.

8

The Supreme Court of Tennessee

subsequently released one James E. Bailey on the same grounds. 7 9
The court finds that the cases of Boyd and Winslow differ from the
cases of Rhea and Bailey in that Boyd and Winslow were given express notice in the indictment.
Counsel for the defendants naturally contended that the Boyd and
Winslow cases are controlled by the Rhea and Bailey cases. They
insist that in the two latter cases the court adjudged the entire
Habitual Criminal Act unconstitutional.
74. 312 S.W.2d 174 (Tenn. 1958).
75. TENN. PuB. ACTS 1939, ch. 22. This act was amended to eliminate the
features which gave rise to the instant case, and now appears as amended in
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2801 (1956).
76. TENN. PUB. ACTS 1939, ch. 22 § 4.
77. TENN. Ptmi. ACTS 1939, ch. 22 § 5.
78. Rhea v. Edwards, 136 F. Supp. 671 (M.D. Tenn. 1955), af'd, 238 F.2d 850

(6th Cir. 1956). See Earle, Criminal Law and Procedure-956 Tennessee
Survey, 9 VAND. L. REV. 980, 989 (1956).
79. Bailey v. State, 312 S.W.2d 174 (Tenn. 1958).
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The theory of the court in the present cases is that they are controlled by the rule of severability or the doctrine of elision and that
the statements contained in the Rhea case are controlling only if the
same question arises in the present case. 80 The court quotes the Tennessee rule of elision as given in Davidson County v. Elrod:81
Perhaps the clearest statement of the rule is that if it is made to appear
from the face of the statute that the Legislature would have enacted it
with the objectionable features omitted, then those portions of the statute
which are not objectionable will be held valid and enforceable, State ex
rel. Bond v. Taylor, 119 Tenn. 229, 257, 104 S.W. 242, provided, of course,
there is left enough of the Act for a complete law capable of enforcement
and fairly answering the object of its passage. Reelfoot Lake Levee District v. Dawson, supra.
The court then goes on to show that after the elision of the objectionable features mentioned, "there is left enough of the Act for a complete law capable of enforcement,"8 2 and the court further concludes
that the statute after the elision is one "fairly answering the object of
its passage."''
The court concluded that the petition should not have been granted
since the Habitual Criminal Act of Tennessee, after the elision of the
provision with reference to eliminating notice, is a constitutional
enactment which does not violate the due process clause or any other
clause of the state or federal constitution.
The writer cannot agree with this conclusion reached in these cases
as they relate to previous decisions of the state and federal courts.
A critical analysis of this case in relation to the court decisions in the
Rhea case and the constitutionality of the statute prior to the 1950
amendment, may be found in the sections on constitutional law of
this survey.
80. Citing Staten v. State, 191 Tenn. 157, 232 S.W.2d 18 (1950); State ex rel.
Lea v. Brown, 166 Tenn. 669, 64 S.W.2d 841 (1933); Clark v. Lary, 35 Tenn.
77 (1855).
81. 191 Tenn. 109, 112, 232 S.W.2d 1, 2 (1950).
82. 312 S.W.2d 174, 178 (1958).
83. Id. at 179.

